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Summary
This paper analyzes the Ukrainian crisis through the lenses of the contemporary real-
ist schools of the theory of international relations. One the one hand, it is claimed 
that Russian responses were motivated by the logic of the balance of powers, upset by 
actions taken by the West. On the other hand, we prove that realism still has signifi-
cant explanatory power in the context of 21st century.
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The significance of realist thinking in international relations is unquestionable. Real-
ism has been the predominant theory after the emergence of international relations 
as an academic discipline, and despite harsh criticism it has considerable relevance 
in the globalized world of the 21st century (Dunne–Schmidt, 2014:99–112). Never-
theless, it cannot be regarded as the sole theory, as several schools of realism exist 
parallel to one another. Nowadays, and especially after the end of the Cold War, three 
different schools predominate the realist way of thinking: defensive realism, offensive 
realism and neo-classical realism.
In this paper it is claimed that realism undoubtedly has a significant explanatory 
power in the field of international relations, however, different schools of realism 
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emphasize different aspects of practical phenomena. As a result, a weakness of one 
theory can be the strength of the other, but at the end of the day, realism as a bunch of 
different theories suitable for explaining and interpreting the events of world politics.
To prove the above claims, the recent Ukrainian crisis is analyzed. Theorists and 
analysts interpret this crisis differently. One may claim that Russian President Vladimir 
Putin’s aggressive personality and antidemocratic attitude is responsible for the re-
cent events, while others might blame Western intelligence services for the ouster of 
pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. In this paper, we claim that the 
outbreak of the military conflict is rooted in the structure of the international system 
and its features made Russia to act aggressively. To argue for this view, we use the ana-
lytical framework of offensive realism. In addition, we also invoke a defensive realist 
approach (the other significant branch of structural realism) and neo-classical realist 
ideas to make a comparison with and supplement the offensive realist way of thinking. 
The paper is structured as follows: the main characteristics of the three schools 
of contemporary realism are described, then they are applied to the Ukrainian case. 
Finally, we conclude the main findings of the paper.
Contemporary Theories of Realism
Although this paper focuses on contemporary realist theories, it is unavoidable to 
spare some words on their background. Although the description of classical realism 
– influenced by the Thukydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes – falls beyond the scope of 
this study, it is worth noting that Morgenthau’s classical realism was the predominant 
school after WWII. Based on a pessimistic view of man, this unit-level approach de-
duced its findings from human nature. Classical realists claimed that since states are 
led by people, they also act like people: one state is a wolf to another state and this is 
the reason why they pursue power.1
Structural realists also view international politics as a dangerous game led by pursuit 
of power but their approach is quite different. Instead of classical realists’ state-level 
angle, structural realists (also called neo-realists) claim for a systemic approach and de-
duct their findings from the structure of international system. This tradition – inspired 
by natural sciences and economic theories of industrial organizations – was started by 
Waltz’s seminal works and has been followed by others in the recent decades (Waltz, 
1959; 1979). Nowadays, the Waltzian way of structural realism is often called “defensive 
realism”, while another notable branch, offensive realism also plays an important role 
in contemporary structural realist thinking (Mearsheimer, 2013, 77–93).
In spite of this, structural realism has often been criticized for not being able to ex-
plain new global phenomena of the 21st century. Therefore a new school of thoughts, 
neo-classical realism has emerged. In certain respects it reaches back to the roots of 
classical realism to supplement the presumed incompleteness of neo-realism (Jack-
son–Sorensen, 2013).
In the following subsections the main features of the three latter theories are 
characterized. Since our further analysis is primarily based on offensive realism, the 
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description begins with its characteristics including the overview of basic properties 
of structural realism in the broader sense. Then the differentiating attributes of the 
other two schools are analyzed.
Offensive Realism
Mearsheimer is considered to be the leading scholar in offensive realism. The descrip-
tion below about the nature of offensive realism is based on his seminal book – The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics – and his other works (Mearsheimer, 2001).
Offensive realism is built on five bedrock assumptions:
1.) The international system is anarchic. In this respect, anarchy is not equal to 
chaos but refers to the lack of hierarchy. It means that there is no central author-
ity, “no night watchman” that states could turn to for help in the case of emergency 
(Mearsheimer, 2010:387).
2.) Realism traditionally focuses on states but offensive realism emphasizes that 
great powers are the major players of international politics and each of them possesses 
some offensive military capacity. It implies that “states are potentially dangerous to 
each other” (Mearsheimer, 2001:30).
3.) “States can never be certain about other states’ intentions” (Mearsheimer, 
2001:31). This assumption does not refer to the necessity of hostile intentions but 
emphasizes the danger of uncertainty.
4.) The primary goal of states is survival. They may have further objectives but they 
cannot seek them without securing their own existence. Therefore, survival is more 
important than any other motive.
5.) States are rational actors. This assumption does not exclude the possibility of 
miscalculation but claims that states think strategically and act intentionally and ra-
tionally in their best interest (Mearsheimer, 2009:241–256).
Mearsheimer emphasizes that none of these assumptions alone implies that states 
will act aggressively towards each other, but the “marriage” between these five as-
sumptions create a dangerous world. Under these circumstances states are afraid of 
each other and the only way to secure their own survival is to gain as much power as 
possible. However, this intensifies the sense of insecurity in other states that also make 
efforts at acting similarly.
In this respect, power is a tool to guarantee survival. In the realist school of inter-
national politics, power is usually measured by military capacities, but Mearsheimer 
claims that military power is based on the socio-economic background of countries. 
As a result, wealth and the population – as the basis of latent power – also matter.
Nevertheless, the pursuit of power leads to security competition – or a security 
dilemma, in Herzian terms – where “most steps a great power takes to enhance its 
own security decrease the security of other states” (Mearsheimer, 2013:80). Under 
these circumstances, the best way for a state to survive is reaching hegemony, in other 
words, ruling the system. However, Mearsheimer claims that achieving global hegem-
ony is unattainable because of the large bodies of water on the globe. Since offensive 
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realism argues for the primacy of conventional military forces (i.e. nuclear weapons 
only serve defensive goals), oceans prevent great powers from obtaining and sustain-
ing dominance over distant continents. As a consequence, great powers seek to gain 
regional hegemony and preempt other states “in other regions from duplicating their 
feat” (Mearsheimer, 2006:160).
Nonetheless, this behavior always generates conflicts between states. The pursuit 
of regional hegemony affects the interest of neighboring states because it upsets the 
balance of powers in favour of the emerging great power. According to the theory 
of offensive realism, the affected states can respond in either of two ways: they may 
form a balancing coalition against the potential hegemon, or choose a ‘buck-passing’2 
strategy. In addition, the prevention of the emergence of another regional hegemon 
(in another region) is also a conflictual process. In as much as the existing region-
al hegemon wants other regions to be divided it has to contain aspiring hegemons 
by forming balancing coalition against them. As a consequence, the rise of a great 
power – which is encoded in the logic of the security competition under anarchy – 
always leads to conflicts and aggressive strategies. At the end of the day, this is the 
reason why “international politics is a nasty and dangerous business” and according 
to Mearsheimer “that is the tragedy of great power politics” (Mearsheimer, 2006:162).
Defensive Realism
Waltz’s theory of international politics (Waltz, 1979) represented the “original” way 
of structural realist thinking, but after the emergence of Mearsheimer’s offensive 
realism, it has often been labelled as “defensive realism” (Jackson–Sorensen, 2013; 
Mearsheimer, 2013). Nowadays, prominent scholars like Posen, Snyder and Van Evera 
belong to this school of thought. Since offensive realism is built on Waltz’s system-
level approach in many respects, the general features of structural realism are not 
repeated here. However, the following description provides an overview of those ideas 
of defensive realism which differ from those of offensive realism.
The main debate between the two schools of structural realism concerns the “ade-
quate amount” of power. Contrary to offensive realism, defensive realists do not think 
that states want as much power as possible (Mearsheimer, 2013). Instead, they are 
considered to strive only for the appropriate amount of power (Waltz, 1989:39–52) 
to maintain the existing balance of powers and to prevent the trigger of a counter-
balancing coalition against them (Dunne–Schmidt, 2014).
Furthermore, defensive realists claim that the costs of conquest often exceed its 
benefits. In other words, the “balance between offense and defence” – which is an 
important subject of investigation among defensive realists – favours the defensive 
strategy on many occasions (Van Evera, 1998:5–43). Therefore, rational actor states 
prefer the maintenance of balance of powers to acting aggressively towards others.
In sum, “defensive realism presents a slightly more optimistic view of international 
politics” (Taliaferro, 2000:159). Although defensive realists also claim that great pow-
ers seek to guarantee their survival in the anarchic structure of international relations, 
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they emphasize that since the pursuit of power can easily backfire, states “temper their 
appetite for power” (Mearsheimer, 2013:82).
Neo-Classical Realism
The end of the Cold War basically changed the international system. New phenomena 
emerged that challenged structural realism too. It also provoked the emergence of a 
new school of realism: neo-classical realism. Neo-classical realists (e.g. Rose, Schweller, 
Zakaria) built their theories mostly on Waltz’s structural realism, however, they also 
reached back to the roots of classical realism. Moreover, they were also inspired by 
liberal approaches that dominated international relations theory at the turn of the 
millenium (Jackson–Sorensen, 2013).
Neo-classical realists attempt to include additional – individual and domestic fac-
tors – in their analysis in order to move beyond the parsimonous assumptions of 
neo-realism (Dunne–Schmidt, 2014). Although they aknowledge the structural real-
ist argument about the importance of the international anarchy, they claim that the 
structure of the international system only provides incentives for states but it does not 
predetermine their behavior. The outcome of foreign policy is influenced by internal 
characteristics of state and political leadership, as well as by domestic societal actors, 
like interest groups too (Lobell–Ripsman–Taliaferro, 2009; Rose, 1998:144–172). As 
Rose claims, this approach has much in common with historical that of institutional-
ist too. Nonetheless, in this regard, states are not treated as “like units”,  and foreign 
policy becomes an important tool that may help scholars to explain different strate-
gies among nations (Dunne–Schmidt, 2014).
The Ukrainian Crisis
In 2014, several revolutionary events took place in the Ukraine that provoked the Rus-
sian annexation of the Crimea. However, the outbreak of a military crisis was preceded 
by actions taken by Western countries. In the current section the analytical framework 
of offensive realism (with further additions) is used to claim that the outbreak of the 
crisis was encoded in the international structure and the aggressive Russian response 
was inevitable under the current circumstances.
According to the offensive realist arguments, the NATO expansion and the Eu-
ropean Union association process are two major factors that must not be neglected 
in relation to the Ukrainian crisis (Mearsheimer, 2014:1–12). Firstly, the 2008 NATO 
summit held in Bucharest made an attempt at getting the Ukraine closer to the West. 
The Summit Declaration stated that “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Eu-
ro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO” and “these countries will become 
members of NATO”.3 Although further virtual steps were not taken for the military in-
corporation of Ukraine into the Western alliance, the declaration of intent above may 
be considered as a direct threat from the Russian point of view. The expansion of the 
European Union had a similar but more direct effects on the conflict. Following the 
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launch of its Eastern Partnership Programme in 2008, the European Union planned 
to sign an association agreement with the Ukraine, which was declined by Ukrainian 
President Viktor Yanukovich at the end of 2013. This association would have meant 
the economic integration of Ukraine in the West. However, this act would have been 
a hostile action to Russia’s interest. Nevertheless, this veto provoked serious protests 
in the Ukraine that led to the overthrow of President Yanukovich and finally made 
Russia to respond by military intervention in Ukraine.
Anyway, the structural realist (both offensive and defensive realist) interpretation 
of the events is straightforward: the Ukraine’s incorporation into the Western – either 
economic or military – institutions would have upset the balance of powers, and Rus-
sia could not let that happen. The reason why Putin answered aggressively was not of 
his personal attitude or irrationality but since the structure of international system 
made him to act so. As Western actions attempted to alter the status quo of the relative 
power which would reduce Russia’s sense of security, the principles of realists’ self-
help world forced Putin to react by military means. In this respect, Russian military 
intervention in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine served as a radical step towards the 
recuperation of the balance of powers.
Nevertheless, the explanations given for the Western strategy may differ among – 
and even within – different realist approaches. The fact that the virtual actor behind 
the term “West” is not straightforward also complicates interpretation. Although the 
United States can be considered as a major actor in the conflict, officially it has noth-
ing to do with the European Union’s association agreement. Considering the Euro-
pean Union as the main Western actor is also problematic: according to structural 
realism, states are the only significant players in international politics, moreover, the 
European Union does not even have an effective common foreign policy. Nonethe-
less, we ignore these counterarguments and consider that the US (as the leading 
country of NATO) and the European Union as such were the main actors within the 
Western alliances.
Regarding NATO expansion, a regular offensive realist argument could suggest 
that the United States – as a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere – wanted to 
prevent the emergence of another potential regional hegemon. However, Russia can-
not be considered as an aspiring hegemon. In spite of Europe’s dependence on Rus-
sian energy, Russia is not a prosperous country. Although it has remarkable military ca-
pacities, their technology is quite old-fashioned and the country’s latent power – based 
on its economic potential – is also weak. Thus as Mearsheimer claims (Mearsheimer, 
2014), Russia is a declining power which implies that the United States need not have 
to make attempts at containing it by expanding NATO’s sphere of interest.
Accepting the above argument, offensive realists might also claim that a miscalcu-
lation or simply mistaken decisions were made both in the US and in the European 
Union. Such actions are more common if the security of the state is not in danger, as 
then they can pursue further goals besides survival. In this respect, one might claim 
that overconfidence about their own security made the US and the European Union 
to move into Russia’s backyard without thinking through the consequences of this act.
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The Ukraine’s Western integration does not fit into the defensive realist theory 
either. According to them, rational actors temper their appetite for power in order 
to prevent conflicts. Nonetheless, this did not happen to the West in the case of the 
Ukrainian crisis, and as a result, instead of maintaining the balance of powers, they 
upset it.
However, neo-classical realism may provide explanations for these strategically 
wrong actions. They might claim that American and European decision-makers were 
influenced by domestic factors (e.g. need for vote-maximization in domestic politics; 
pressure from the proponents of democracy export and from business interest groups 
etc.). According to this interpretation, constraints on the anarchic international sys-
tem were ineffective on Western politicians, who subjected their foreign policy to 
secondary goals (instead of taking care of the balance of powers).
Though, neo-classical arguments provide a plausible explanation for the behav-
iour of Western countries, it may shed new light on Russian strategy too. Namely, 
domestic factors might have influenced Russian President Putin too. Although the 
idea about a rough Putin who wants to show strength to his own people, come from 
the liberal schools of international relations, it might be compatible with neo-classical 
realism too. Nevertheless, this view cannot overwrite the fact – which is a recognized 
one in neo-classical realism too – that aggressive response was mainly motivated by the 
crude logic of balance of power.
Conclusions
This paper aims to overview the main characteristics of contemporary realist theories 
and intended to show their applicability in the globalized world of 21st century. As 
presented in the case study about the Ukrainian crisis, realism has not lost its explana-
tory power after the Cold War: the world has not changed and international relations 
are still governed by great power politics. We also showed that different schools of 
contemporary realism may perform differently in interpreting distinct aspects of in-
ternational events but at the end of the day, realism as a bunch of several theories is 
completely able to explain them.
In the case of the Ukrainian crisis, we claimed that Russian response was primarily 
motivated by the logic of the balance of powers. Since the West moved into Russia’s 
sphere of interest, Putin was forced to apply his own version of the “Monroe Doc-
trine” (Mearsheimer, 2014). In this respect, Russia was not driven by “evil intentions”, 
but by the everlasting logic of great power politics.
Notes
1  For further readings see e.g.: Lebow, 2013, 59–76.; Morgenthau, 1978.
2  Buck-passing means that states do not act to contain emerging great powers, instead they let other states 
to do that job.
3  Bucharest Summit Declaration. Official webpage of NATO, e-Library, 2008, www.nato.int/cps/en/nato-
live/official_texts_8443.htm.
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